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One of the areas most widely studied in forensic psy-chology in recent years concerns the possibility of
discriminating between true accounts and false ones. An
account may fail to describe the reality of a situation
because people consciously lie, or because of faulty
memory. 
Popular belief about the functioning of memory attrib-
utes the majority of inaccuracies in a statement to the
first explanation (Mira & Diges, 1991). Thus, if a person
reports an event that never happened, or did not happen
as they report it, this is inevitably due to the fact that
they do not want to tell the truth.  
However, research over several decades has shown that
memory is far from perfect, and is limited not only in its
capacity, but also due to the effect of innumerable fac-
tors that distort it, leading to errors (unintentional) of
both omission and commission. That is, giving rise to
false memories (the most comprehensive review in
Spanish is Diges, 1997).
Thus, leaving aside the intentional provision of false
data, the majority of accounts of events are riddled with
errors beyond the person’s control. The commonest
sources of error are perceptual problems, the interpreta-
tion of events, the inference of non-processed informa-
tion, the passage of time and/or the incorporation of
false information after the event.
Every time witnesses recount an event, think about
what happened, and above all answer questions for
which they do not have a clear response based on their
own recall, their memory undergoes transformations
that accelerate its deterioration beyond that which would
result from the passage of time alone. 
Even our most vivid memories are sprinkled with
details that never existed. And that includes those mem-
ories that we appear to be able to summon up as if they
had just occurred, as though we were reliving them,
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seemingly unaltered by time. This type of autobiograph-
ical memory, known as vivid memories or flashbulb
memories, refers to events that made a strong impact on
us for individual reasons or because of their social reper-
cussions, and seem to have been “engraved in fire”. This
type of memory would be found, for example, in victims
of violent and/or traumatic events (road accidents,
bombings, assaults, etc.). And although people with
such memories may say that “I’ll remember it as long as
I live”, no memory is in fact immune to deterioration.
Various researchers (e.g., Brown & Kulik, 1977; Neisser
& Harsch, 1992; Pillemer, 1984) in this field have
shown that certain memories about what one was doing
at the time of an event of this type are not real.
Do we really think we have seen things that never
occurred?
A large number of studies have shown that witnesses to
an event have great difficulty deciding whether a sug-
gested detail was actually seen by them or comes from
other sources, such as the recounting of the event or the
questions asked by a researcher. Loftus, Donders,
Hoffman and Schooler (1989) found that participants
had the same level of confidence in the reality of their
actual memories and in their suggested memories. Even
so, this confidence is not sufficient to state that the wit-
nesses actually believe in what they say. 
In an attempt to demonstrate empirically that people
believe in the reality of their imagined or suggested
memories, Lindsay and Johnson (1987, 1989) carried
out various studies in which they asked participants to
identify the origin of their real and suggested memories.
The results showed that people confused their origin.
However, it would seem that witnesses do not always
have problems for distinguishing the origin of their
memories. Zaragoza and Koshmider (1989) carried out
an experiment in which they obliged participants to
identify the origin of their memories of each detail. In
this case, the results showed that subjects were capable
of realizing the origin of their suggested memories.
Nevertheless, both Lindsay and Johnson and Zaragoza
and Koshmider found that although in general people
could correctly identify the origin of suggested or imag-
ined memories, in some cases confusion occurred, so
that they attributed a real origin to a suggested memory.
In these cases subjects were sure of having seen the sug-
gested details of the event.
In an effort to resolve this controversy, Lindsay (1990)
used a new paradigm (Jacoby’s logic of opposition) for
testing the hypothesis of subjects’ certain belief in their
suggested memories. After subjects had viewed a series
of slides depicting an event, the event was described to
them with the inclusion of some false information. They
were then asked a series of questions. The new paradigm
consisted in informing them that there would be no
questions in which the correct answer was found only in
the description and not in the real event. Answering
affirmatively in the case of the suggested details would
indicate that they were attributed to the original event,
since they could not be explained by “task demands”.
The results showed that in a condition of low discrim-
inability (when the event and the suggestion were pre-
sented in the same session and the recall test two days
later, and the voice accompanying the slide show and
describing the event with the false information was the
same), subjects confirmed the suggested details in 27%
of cases, while the figure for the subjects who were not
given false information was just 9%. Moreover, the data
showed an overall decay of memories in those subjects
who had been fed false information. 
With a view to reinforcing this evidence of certain
belief, Weingardt, Loftus and Lindsay (1995) carried out
further research with a modified version of the paradigm
used by Lindsay. While Lindsay informed subjects that
there were no correct answers in the description that
contained the suggestions, Weingardt’s group told their
subjects that if they recalled having seen an item in the
original event they should not indicate it. The results
showed that the subjects to whom false items had been
suggested included them in the list on original items.
These results were obtained even obliging subjects to
use strict criteria for distinguishing the origin of memo-
ries through a system of bets that indicated high involve-
ment in the judgements. This evidence serves to rein-
force the findings of Lindsay and strengthens the argu-
ment that subjects who are fed false information after
the event sometimes believe firmly that such informa-
tion is true.
Why do we confuse false data with what really
happened?
One of the hypotheses proposed in response to this ques-
tion states that it is because of a defect in the mecha-
nisms that permit us to distinguish the origin of memo-
ries (Lindsay, 1990; Zaragoza & Lane, 1994), within the
framework of Johnson and Raye’s (1981) Reality
Monitoring model (see Figure 1). 
Johnson and Raye distinguished between two types of
memories according to their origin: perceptual and self-
generated; in turn, they distinguished three different ori-
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gins among the second type: a) re-representations of the
perceptual experience or memories of something previ-
ously experienced, where the information that has dis-
appeared from the consciousness or the active memory
is reactivated later in the absence of the original external
stimulus; b) cotemporal thoughts, processes of elabora-
tion and association that augment, link up or enrich, as
one goes along, perceptual experiences that do not nec-
essarily form part of the true representation of the per-
ceptual experience; and c) fantasies, which involve new
combinations of information that produce imaginary
events which occur only in our imagination.
The process through which we discriminate the source
of memories depends on various factors. Johnson and
Raye (1981) point out that the same process is not
always followed, and that it will vary depending on the
nature of the information recalled, on the conditions in
which it occurs, and on the cost of errors. Decision-mak-
ing about the origin of a given memory is based on two
aspects: a) comparison of the attributes of the specific
memory trace, with the typical discriminative attributes
for the two types of memories; and b) a reasoning
process that takes into account the qualitative character-
istics of memory traces –resulting from the previous
comparison–, the additional information related to the
trace and stored in the memory, and the person’s knowl-
edge about the capacity and functioning of their own
memory and that of others (knowledge of meta-memo-
ry). Thus, in a case in which we try to discern the source
of a memory whose origin we are not sure about (for
example, whether we already told a story or we only
imagine we have told it), we would analyze the charac-
teristics of the memory (details of the context in which
we might have told the story, sensory information,
whether or not cognitive processes are involved in the
trace, etc.); if the balance of characteristics is in favour
of the prototype of a memory deriving from the imagi-
nation, and if the reasoning about the information relat-
ed to the trace (e.g., “it’s unlikely that I’ve told this story
because I don’t usually talk about these things to these
people”), and our metamemory knowledge (e.g., “I usu-
ally have a good memory of my own acts in circum-
stances like these”) suggest this, then we would con-
clude that in all likelihood this memory is the product of
the imagination, and does not relate to reality.
According to the model, memories of external origin
differ from those of internal origin in a series of specif-
ic dimensions (Johnson & Raye, 1981; Johnson,
Hashtroudi & Lindsay, 1993). Memories of external ori-
gin have more contextual and sensory attributes, and
more semantic detail; self-generated memories, on the
other hand, contain more information on cognitive oper-
ations.
In this theoretical framework, numerous studies have
been carried out with the aim of studying the differential
characteristics of each type of memory, and how these
are affected by different factors. These studies on dis-
crimination between different sources of memories are
interpreted in line with a distinction between different
kinds of external-origin information, or between exter-
nally and internally generated information, or indeed
between two kinds of information of internal origin. In
the first case (external-external), the most common type
of research looks at discrimination between different
modes of origin of information, such as between verbal
and non-verbal information (Hertel & Narvaez, 1986),
or at post-event information (e.g., Alonso-Quecuty,
1993; Manzanero, 1993, 2001a; Lindsay & Johnson,
1989; Schooler, Gerhard & Loftus, 1986). Typical stud-
ies on the distinction between an external source and an
internal one include those that attempt to throw light on
the properties of each of these types of memory with
respect to (external) reality and those that deal with self-
Figure 1
Reality Monitoring Model (Johnson & Raye, 1981 pp. 73)





2. Dimensions o,~ which the classes of externally generated and internal-
ly generated memories typically differ
– External have more contextual attributes
– External have more sensory attributes
– External have more semantic detail
– Internal include more information about cognitive operations 
3. Processing characteristics of reality monitoring
• Decisions about the origin of a specific trace may be based on a
weighted combination of the results of comparing the target trace
attributes indicated above to criteria defining the general classes of
external and internal representations
• Decisions may be based on a reasoning process involving
– Qualitative characteristics of the target trace
– Characteristics of related traces
– Metamemory assumptions
• Which processes take place should depend on such factors as time,
availability of different types of information, cost of mistakes, and so
forth
4. Sources of errors in reality monitoring
– Target trace not typical of its class
– Characteristics of similar incorrect traces
– Failure in a reasoning process (e.g., failure to retrieve additional
information, incorrect metamemory assumptions)
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generated memories from dreams (e.g., Johnson, Kahan
& Raye, 1984), from the imagination (e.g., Johnson,
1988; Johnson, Foley, Suengas & Raye, 1988;
Manzanero & Diges, 1994a; Suengas & Johnson, 1988)
and from lies (e.g., Alonso-Quecuty, 1990; López &
Zaldivar, 2002). Finally, the third important group of
studies involves attempts to distinguish between two
internal sources (e.g., Johnson, Kahan & Raye, 1984;
Alonso-Quecuty, 1990). Furthermore, a research line
has been developed that analyzes how memories of an
event deteriorate from the point of view of the reality
monitoring model, losing properties of the perceived
traces under the influence of different variables, such as
previous knowledge (Diges, 1995), perceptual mode
(Henkel, Franklin & Johnson, 2000), preparation
(Manzanero & Diges, 1995), questioning and multiple
recall (Manzanero, 1994), or contextual factors
(Manzanero, 2001b).
Are real memories truly different from false ones?
Schooler, Gerhard and Loftus (1986) applied a reality
monitoring model in an attempt to distinguish real
accounts from imagined ones through a series of ques-
tions biased with false information. In a first experi-
ment, they showed one group of participants a series of
slides of a road accident at a intersection with a yield
sign, while another group were shown the same slides,
but without the yield sign. Subsequently, they were
asked about the event portrayed, and the presence of
the sign (which they did not actually see) was suggest-
ed to the second group. In the third phase of the exper-
iment, all participants were asked if they recalled see-
ing the sign, and if so, to describe it. On analyzing the
descriptions of the sign produced by participants from
the two groups who claimed to recall it, Schooler et al.
(1986) found the descriptions based on fact to be qual-
itatively different from those based on suggested infor-
mation, as indeed the model proposes. The descriptions
by those to whom the information was suggested are
longer, and contain more verbal hedges or clichés and
more references to cognitive operations, and fewer sen-
sory details, than the descriptions based on reality.
In a later study, Schooler, Clark and Loftus (1988) car-
ried out an experiment similar to the previous one, but
with different material (instead of a Give Way sign, they
used three non-existent objects supposedly stolen in the
film) and with different recall mode (in the first study
participants responded in writing, and now they gave
oral responses which were recorded on video). The
results showed that the suggested memories included
more allusions to cognitive processes, more self-refer-
ences (more frequent appearance of the pronoun “I”)
and more verbal hedges; while real memories included
more allusions to perceptual processes and more senso-
ry details. On the other hand, and in contrast to the find-
ings of the first study (Schooler et al., 1986), the
accounts based on internal sources were not significant-
ly longer than those based on external ones.
On the basis of the findings from these two experi-
ments, further research has attempted to analyze the
qualitative differences between true accounts and those
that involve material suggested in different conditions.
Alonso-Quecuty (1993), using as material a real event,
assessed the effect of post-event information on the
quantity of contextual, sensory and idiosyncratic infor-
mation and the length of accounts, finding significant
differences only in relation to length (the real accounts
were longer than the ones with suggested information). 
Different results were found in two experiments
(Manzanero, 2001a) in which participants were fed false
information (a stop sign) immediately after having seen
a video of a road accident. In the first experiment, par-
Figure 2
Mean and statistical scores for the significant differences (*) (Manzanero, 2001a, Experiment 1)
Suggestion Not suggested Suggested t(58) Falsehood False Real t(43)
Accurate information 14,667 14,111 Accurate information* 11,875 14,595 1.837,p<.05 
Distortions 2,333 2,622 Distortions 2,5 2,649
Sensory information 5,133 4,067 Sensory information* 2,25 4,459 2.129,p<.01
Contextual information* 13,067 6,933 4.826, p<.0001 Contextual information 6,125 7,108
Mental processes* 3,933 2,311 2.04, p<.05 Mental processes 2,265 2,243
Judgements and comments 0,733 0,756 Judgements and comments 1,375 0,622
Self-references* 2,867 1,489 1.777, p<.05 Self-references 2,25 1,324
Expressions of doubt 0,933 0,644 Expressions of doubt 1,125 0,541
Length 174,467 149,711 Length 148,75 149,919
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ticipants were asked to give their accounts half an hour
after the suggestion of the false information, whilst in
the second one they recounted the events one week later.
In either case the experimenters measured the quantity
of accurate information, distortions, sensory informa-
tion, contextual information, allusions to cognitive
processes, personal judgements and comments, expres-
sions of doubt and self-references and the length of the
accounts. The results showed in the first experiment
(Figure 2) that the accounts by those who were fed false
information contained less contextual information,
fewer allusions to cognitive processes and fewer self-
references, considering the accounts independently of
whether the information had been accepted by the par-
ticipants or not; when a distinction was made between
false accounts, which mentioned the suggested informa-
tion, and true accounts, which did not mention it, the for-
mer were found to provide smaller amounts of accurate
information and of sensory information.
The results of the second experiment (Figure 3), with a
delay of one week, showed that the suggestion of infor-
mation, regardless of whether it was accepted, gave rise
to accounts with less sensory information and fewer
allusions to cognitive processes; and if we consider the
accounts in which participants accepted (and mentioned)
the suggested false information, they contained less
accurate information, fewer distortions and less sensory
information.
Thus, people’s errors in discriminating false information
from real information were associated with a lack of dif-
ferences in contextual information, idiosyncratic informa-
tion (judgements, personal comments and self-references)
and related cognitive processes, or to a qualitative profile
different from what would be expected according to real-
ity monitoring processes. At the same time, true accounts
were richer, with more sensory information.
None of the previous experiments found contextual dif-
ferences among the two types of memories (or at least
not in the expected direction) when participants accept-
ed the suggested false information. In this regard, Diges
(1997) proposes that the confusion between a real mem-
ory and a false one would arise because those who
accept the false information would automatically create
contextual links between the content of the memory and
their personal past. Thus, Diges proposes three condi-
tions for a false memory to be considered as true or real:
a) it seems familiar, b) it seems plausible, and c) it has
sufficient contextual links.
Moreover, it would appear that subjects’ descrip-
tions of memories, considered globally, do not differ
substantially whether they are real or imagined,
which makes it impossible to discriminate between
them according to the features mentioned (Lindsay &
Johnson, 1989). Also, the suggestion of false infor-
mation post-event, despite not affecting the overall
description in general terms, decays subjects’ memo-
ry of the event, as various studies have shown. When
subjects accept the false information, the quantity of
accurate information decreases (Manzanero, 2001,
Experiment 1), though curiously so does the number
of distortions (Manzanero, 2001a, Experiment 2). For
his part, Lindsay (1994) found that when participants
were asked to recall an event after being provided
with false information, the amount of accurate infor-
mation in their account decreased, but the number of
distortions and false alarms –even with regard to
information unrelated to the suggested false details–
increased. And it is this last finding that is most note-
worthy. It appears that providing people with false
information has a general effect on the quality of their
accounts, even when this information is rejected by
them.
Figure 3
Mean and statistical scores for the significant differences (*) (Manzanero, 2001a, Experiment 2)
Suggestion Not suggested Suggested t(85) Falsehood False Real t(61)
Accurate information 15,125 14 Accurate information  12,364 14,346 1.564,p=.06
Distortions   2,208 2,921 Distortions*  1,909 3,135 1.746,p<.05
Sensory information 5,042 4,063 Sensory information* 2,182 4,462 2.687,p<.005
Contextual information* 13,042 8,413 3.924, p<.0001 Contextual information 7,091 8,692
Mental processes* 4,083 2,683 1.988, p<.05 Mental processes 2,909 2,635
Judgements and comments 0,625 0,667 Judgements and comments 1 0,596
Self-references 2,708 1,746 Self-references 2,091 1,673
Expressions of doubt 0,792 0,762 Expressions of doubt  1,091 0,692
Length 173,417 159,73 Length 140,818 163,731
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Can we assess the truth of an account according to
differential attributes?
It would seem that the process we use for distinguishing
the origin of our own memories is similar to the one we
use for assessing others’ memories, as argued by several
authors who propose similar models (e.g., Wells &
Lindsay, 1983) and different studies that have analyzed
the parallels between the two processes, finding numer-
ous similarities (e.g., Schooler, Gerhard & Loftus,
1986).
It is a fact that we customarily employ this type of
process of discrimination of the origin of memories,
apparently with some success. However, we are often
surprised to find that things we remember, or people tell
us, never actually happened like that.
In this regard, Johnson and Raye indicate three possi-
ble sources of error in the discrimination process: a) the
reasoning process is based on erroneous knowledge of
metamemory or on related, but inaccurate, information;
b) the memory traces on which we base our comparison
do not belong to the memory category in which they are
classified; and c) the specific trace may not have the fea-
tures characteristic of the trace of its class.
Thus, taking into account the results mentioned above,
it may be quite difficult to distinguish a real account
from a false one based on the differential attributes
described. In this direction, research has found that the
percentage of errors in discrimination ranges from 48-
40% in studies with adults and suggested accounts
(Schooler, Gerhard & Loftus, 1986) to 37.5% with
adults and imagined accounts (Manzanero & Diges,
1994b), and to 36% with children’s testimonies
(Santtila, Roppola & Niemi, 1998). In all the studies,
slightly over one in three accounts was assessed incor-
rectly.
Nevertheless, Schooler et al. (1986) found that providing
simulated judges with information about the differential
attributes aids discrimination, given that the number of
errors decreases, compared to assessments made with no
such information, by 6-10% (Experiments 4 and 5).
From another perspective, throughout history humans
have insistently sought objective procedures for assess-
ing the truth of an account, and all cultures have devel-
oped techniques for detecting lies. However, all such
techniques and procedures have been based on respon-
dents’ intentional (and therefore conscious) provision of
false data, so that they are not applicable to   the major-
ity of false accounts produced by errors, which lack
intentionality, since the subjects themselves believe they
are telling the truth. Only intentional lying or distortion
would affect (and even then not always) psychophysio-
logical and behavioural dimensions that can be mea-
sured through a range of techniques.
It is for this reason that there have recently emerged
some procedures based on the content analysis of
descriptions of memory. All start out from the assump-
tion that statements proceeding from a real event differ
from those based on a false (mistaken) event in various
dimensions, such as type of expression, type of details
described, doubts expressed, narrative structure, and so
on (for a review, see Manzanero, 2001c). These differ-
ential attributes coincide largely with those proposed in
the framework of the reality monitoring model, giving
rise to a research line aimed at comparing the two pro-
cedures (see, e.g., Strömwell et al., 2004; Sporer, 1997;
Vrij et al.,2004)
Some works (e.g., Escribano & Vallespín, 2000;
Vázquez, 2004) based on forensic practice (in the con-
text of sexual assault) have shown that accounts based
on real events do indeed follow a characteristic pattern,
considered both overall and in highly specific cases.
Nevertheless, the applicability of these results in the
framework of credibility analyses raises numerous prob-
lems, given that (among many other factors) every
account is differenet “world”, and these dimensions can-
not be used as though they were diagnostic criteria
(Offe, 2000; Undeutsch, 1989), such as those set out, for
example, in the DSM-IV, or even as though they consti-
tuted a simple test (Tully, 1998); that is, we cannot con-
sider after the fulfilment of a certain number of criteria
that a statement is credible or not, as some authors pro-
pose (Juárez, 2004; Triandafilou, McCullough & Eslea,
1998). What is true from a statistical point of view is not
always so from an applied perspective. As pointed out
elsewhere (Manzanero, 1996, 2000, 2001c; Tully, 1998),
and proposed by Undeutsch (1989), these techniques
constitute a protocol of analyses that include something
more than a list of symptoms. In fact, several studies
have shown that not all criteria are applicable to just any
type of assault and circumstances (the list of studies is
extensive, as shown by Juárez, 2004, in his doctoral the-
sis, though among them we would highlight that of
Bekerian & Dennett, 1992). Thus, the presence of cer-
tain criteria included in techniques such as Criteria-
Based Content Analysis (CBCA) (Steller & Köhnken,
1989) may go against the credibility of a statement in
some circumstances (Manzanero, 2001c). There are
many factors that affect the content and quality of state-
ments, and their effects are quite varied, as mentioned
above, and as has been shown in a range of studies (e.g.,
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Alonso-Quecuty, 1990, 1993; Diges, 1988, 1995, 1997;
Henkel, Franklin & Johnson, 2000; Manzanero, 1993,
1994, 2001c; Manzanero & Diges, 1994a & b, 1995;
Schooler et al., 1986, 1988; Suengas & Johnson, 1988).
López and Zaldivar (2002), for example, found that only
some content criteria appear to a greater extent in true
statements compared to false ones (lies).
In assessing the credibility of a statement, are attribut-
es based on the reality monitoring model less reliable
than those of techniques based on practice, such as
CBCA? It should be pointed out that higher percentages
of success have been obtained using reality monitoring
criteria than using the CBCA technique as a diagnostic
criterion (Sporer, 1997). Even so, further research is
required in this regard. 
In any case, any light we can shed on how memory
qualities are affected by different factors will contribute
interesting information to increase our knowledge of
memory functioning –knowledge which can be applied
in the field of forensic psychology and the study of eye-
witness testimony.
In order to look more deeply into the question of the
differences between true and non-intentionally-false
accounts, we carried out the following experiment, in
which after manipulating the suggestion of information
and the delay we analyzed participants’ accounts in
terms of their quality, based on the reality monitoring
model (Johnson & Raye, 1981).
Hypothesizing on the results in this case is not easy,
since according to some studies (Lindsay & Johnson,
1987, 1989; Alonso-Quecuty, 1993) there should be no
significant differences between suggested and non-sug-
gested memories, making it difficult to discriminate
their origin; on the other hand, according to other stud-
ies on the content of memory descriptions (Schooler et
al., 1986, 1988), suggested and non-suggested memories
would indeed differ with regard to the features proposed
by Johnson (Johnson & Raye, 1981; Johnson et al.,
1993) for discriminating the origin of the information.
Perhaps the answer lies in the notion that memories of
one origin and the other are actually different, but can
sometimes become confused when some of the key




Sixty people participated in the experiment, all of them
psychology students who volunteered to take part.
Participants were of both sexes and all were of similar age.
Materials
a) As material to be recalled, participants were shown
a complex event in a video lasting 27 seconds with-
out sound. The event concerned was a road traffic
accident in which two cars collide at the junction of
two streets. The scene begins with an introduction
in which we see one of the cars involved in the acci-
dent driving with other vehicles along a road that
passes through a park. The crux of the scene is
when this car reaches a junction, where it stops,
immediately moves off again and collides at low
speed with another vehicle coming from a road at
right angles. The car that appears at the beginning
of the scene is pushed along by the second car for
some distance until they both stop, with consider-
able damage incurred, especially by the first car.
In all cases participants were informed previously
about the nature of the event, the brevity of the
video, and the fact that there was no sound. They
watched the video on a colour television monitor in
a lecture room at the university. The recall tasks
were carried out in the same room.
b) Depending on their condition, participants were
given one of two types of questionnaire. In the mis-
leading condition the questionnaire described the
event using the expression “smash” and suggested
the existence of a stop sign, which did not actually
appear in the video (“Did he see the stop sign at the
junction where the accident occurred?”); in the real
condition, the event was described using the word
“hit”, and the question about the stop sign was omit-
ted.
c) For measuring the accuracy of the accounts provid-
ed by the participants we used a protocol of analy-
ses that describes the event by means of micro-
propositions, whose usefulness in the assessment of
the accounts, avoiding biases and aiding scoring,
has been shown in several previous studies (e.g.,
Diges, 1988, 1995).
Design and Procedure
We used a factorial design with different subjects. The
first independent variable was post-event information,
with two levels (suggestion/no suggestion of informa-
tion), and the second independent variable was delay
between presentation of misleading information and free
recall task, with two levels (immediate/delayed).
Therefore, the design is factorial 2x2.
It was checked that none of the participants had seen
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the material before, and to avoid interference they were
urged not to speak to their colleagues about the experi-
ment, and in particular about the content of the video.
All 60 participants watched the video, and one week
later they were given one form of the questionnaire or
the other, being divided at random into “control group”
and “suggested group”, and into the immediate and
delayed conditions. Once they had filled out the ques-
tionnaire they did a distractor task, which took at least
30 minutes and consisted in replying to a personality
questionnaire. Half of each group were asked for free
recall immediately after this distractor task, and the
other half one week later. Subsequently, the accounts of
participants who accepted the misleading information
and those of participants who did not accept it were con-
sidered separately.
The dependent measures were the same as those of the
previous experiment:
- Total accurate information: total quantity of correct
information provided by participants in their
accounts.
- Distortions: errors of commission, details that did not
appear in the video, or appeared in a different form.
- Sensory information: information referring to senso-
ry and geographical information that actually
appeared: colours, sizes, positions, etc.
- Contextual information: information referring to spa-
tial and temporal features of the scene of the acci-
dent.
- Allusion to cognitive processes: explicit mention of
some cognitive process: imagining, seeing, hearing,
remembering, “… caught my attention”, “… made
me think”, etc.
- Irrelevant information: accurate information that
does not form part of the pre-established script of the
film, and is used for scoring the total information
variable.
- Length: number of words in the account.
- Expressions of doubt: Phrases implying doubts over
what is being described (could be, seem that, I think,
it’s likely, etc.)
- Explanations: information that extends the descrip-
tion of events, providing a functional reference.
- Spontaneous corrections: corrections made to the
description of the facts (except spelling mistakes),
and which appear in the descriptions as crossed out
or changed words.
- Change of order: alteration of the natural order of
occurrence of the event: introduction, core and out-
come.
- Exaggerations: descriptions which, due to excess or
defect, distort the facts.
- Information about source: information about the ori-
gin of the event seen, in relation to both the experi-
mental procedure and the filmed nature of the event,
referring to the form of presentation and the type of
information (position of cameras, video, television
screen, etc.)
- Self-references: References participants make to
themselves in describing the event.
- Personal judgements and comments: judgements of
aspects of the event and respondents’ additional per-
sonal comments.
RESULTS
From the analysis of the free recall (see Figure 4) a
series of analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were carried
out, whose main effects and interactions are shown
below.
Post-event information x delay
We found significant effects of the interaction of the two
independent variables only in the case of quantity of
expressions of doubt, F(1,1,53)=4.443, p<.05.
Post-event information
The post-event information variable significantly
affected the quantity of irrelevant information that
appeared in the accounts, F(1,53)=3.496, p<.05, and
exaggerations, F(1,53)=5.251, p<.05. There were more
Figure 4
Mean scores in the dependent measures for each of the experimental
groups (*significant effects)
Not suggested                 Suggested  
Immediate Delayed Immediate Delayed
Accurate details* 15.06 11 14.53 11.8
Distortions 2 1. 2.4 2
Sensory information* 2.8 0.85 3.15 1.6
Contextual information 4.8 3.35 5.53 2.86
Doubts* 0.6 0.571 1.53 0.2
Exaggerations*  0.33 0.14 0.46 0.86
Irrelevant information* 0.4 0.42 0.92 0.73
Source information 2.33 1.71 2.38 2
Cognitive processes 2.66 1.35 2.07 1.8
Corrections 1.4 1 0.84 0.33
Change of order 0.26 0.14 0.15 0.2
Explanations 0.73 1.07 1.31 1.2
Self-references 2.66 1.57 2.61 1.53
Judgements and comments 1.2 1 1.23 1.26
Length*  147.6 110.64 157.30    128.06
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irrelevant data and more exaggerations in the suggest-
ed accounts than in the non-suggested ones. No signif-
icant main effects of this variable were found in rela-
tion to the rest of the dependent measures. However, in
the case of expressions of doubt the lack of an effect is
misleading (see interaction data). In the immediate
recall condition, the suggested accounts contained
more expressions of doubt than the non-suggested
accounts, t(26)=1.619, p<.05.
Delay
We found significant effects of delay on the quantity of
accurate information, F(1,53)=16.611, p<.0005; sensory
information, F(1,53)=17.507, p<.0001; contextual infor-
mation, F(1,53)=6.52, p<.01; expressions of doubt,
F(1,53)=4.839, p<.05; and length of the accounts,
F(1,53)=7.26, p<.01. The immediate accounts contained
more accurate information and more sensory and con-
textual information, and were longer than the delayed
accounts. The effect on expressions of doubt, as it was
seen, depended on the post-event information, since it
only occurred in the conditions of suggested informa-
tion, appearing more frequently in the case of immediate
recovery than in that of delayed recovery, t(26)=2.507,
p<.01. No main effects were found on the rest of the
dependent measures.
Acceptance of suggested false information
Figure 6 shows the data on the description of the stop
sign for each condition. As it can be seen, there is no dif-
ference in the number of errors committed by partici-
pants in describing the false information in the immedi-
ate recall condition, from which we can deduce that, at
least with regard to accuracy, the suggestion of false
information did not have an effect when recall was
requested after just a few minutes. However, the same
cannot be said when participants describe the event one
week after the suggestion of the false information, when
the number of errors doubles, reaching a figure of 50%
of the participants to whom the information was fed,
compared to 26% of participants who make errors spon-
taneously, χ2 (55)=73.5; p<.05.
Does commission of this error, forced or spontaneously,
affect the quality of the accounts and other measures of
accuracy? In order to respond to this question we analyzed
the differences between the different types of account
according to whether they described the stop sign or not.
Differences in the accounts with suggested
information
Considering the differences found (see Figure 7), we can
observe different patterns for the accounts that describe
the stop sign and for those that do not mention it accord-
ing to the delay. In the case of the accounts provided
immediately after the suggestion of the information it was
found that participants who describe the false information
provide accounts that are qualitatively more internal than
the accounts of those who do not describe it, since they
contain more allusions to cognitive processes, more
explanations and more self-references. On the other hand,
no differences are found with regard to sensory and con-
textual information, and the false accounts contain more
information about source than the true accounts.
The pattern is inverted when participants describe the
event one week after being fed the false information. The
accounts that include the stop sign in the description of
the event are qualitatively more external than those which
do not mention it, since they provide more sensory infor-
mation and more accurate details. As was seen in Figure
6, the percentage of accounts that describe the stop sign
doubles with the delay, increasing from 23% in the imme-
diate condition to 50% in the delayed condition.
Differences in the accounts with non-suggested
information
In the immediate recall condition the participants who
mention the stop sign provide more internal accounts, in
Figure 6
Number of accounts and percentages (%) that describe the stop sign
in each of the experimental groups
Suggested Not suggested
Immediate 3 (23.08%) 3 (21.43%)
Delayed 7 (50%) 4 (26.67%)
Figure 5
Graphic representations of mean scores for expressions of doubt
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the same direction as those participants to whom the
stop sign was suggested, since there appear more allu-
sions to cognitive processes, more personal judgments
and comments and more self-references in the accounts
which mention the stop sign than in those which do not.
The pattern is similar when participants are asked to
describe the event one week later, but in this case no sig-
nificant differences are found. The only difference is
found with regard to the quantity of accurate details,
higher in the accounts of those who do not mention the
stop sign. The percentage of accounts that describe the
stop sign is similar for the two time conditions, though
it tends to increase slightly with the delay. Also, quality
decreases after the disappearance of the differences
between the two types of account.
DISCUSSION
With the precautions necessary in these last analyses,
due to the especially small samples in relation to the
description of the false information, it can be said that
only in the immediate recall conditions have the expec-
tations generated by the reality monitoring model and
previous experiments been fulfilled, with regard to the
notion that false accounts on the basis of the suggested
information would present a more internal profile than
true accounts.
However, we did find confirmation of the hypotheses
according to which those who provide false information
probably do so due to faults in processes of reality mon-
itoring caused by the attributes normally used for dis-
criminating the origin of memories. We should bear in
mind that this is one of the principal sources of error pro-
posed by Johnson and Raye (1981).
Likewise, it is noteworthy, as is the case in other
research, and as mentioned in the introduction, that we
did not find differences with regard to contextual infor-
mation, given that it is one of the basic attributes for dis-
criminating the source of information according to all
proposals, both in the framework of reality monitoring
processes and in that of content analysis (CBCA).
On the other hand, a global analysis of the data reveals
that in the immediate conditions the differences in qual-
ity attributes are significant, whilst in the delayed condi-
tions the differences in accuracy are significant. The loss
of differences over time could be one of the decisive fac-
tors in the deterioration of memory traces that leads sub-
jects to commit more errors of attribution.
Furthermore, from our findings we can state that there
are differences in the patterns found between false
accounts deriving from suggestion and those deriving
from the errors committed on inferring information
using previous knowledge congruent with the event wit-
nessed. When the false information appears in accounts
in the conditions in which its existence was suggested
we can talk about the acceptance of a false suggestion;
when it appears in accounts in which its existence was
not suggested, we can talk about spontaneous errors
deriving from participants’ previous knowledge, in
terms similar to those described by other researchers in
the framework of everyday contexts (Brewer & Treyens,
1981), of chronically accessible categories (Diges,
1995) or of congruence with previous expectations
(Bayen, Nakamura, Dupuis, & Yang, 2000). In this
regard, the data that indicate an increase in internal char-
acteristics concur with those obtained by Diges (1995),
who explains them in terms of the automaticity of pro-
cessing implied by an economy of resources for subjects
that use chronically accessible categories for codifying
and recovering information. The existence of a stop sign
at a junction could be considered a construct that forms
Figure 7
Mean and statistical scores in the dependent measures that showed some significant effect for each of the experimental groups, taking into account
the appearance in the accounts of the false information (stop sign) and the suggestion of information
Not suggested                                                                               Suggested  
Immediate                                      Delayed                                  Immediate                                 Delayed
Stop No stop t(11) Stop No stop t(12) Stop No stop t(12) Stop No stop t(13)
Accurate details 12.3 15.2 13.4 10.3 2.486, p<.01 15.6 14.6 9 11.8 2.426,p<.01
Sensory information 2 3.5 2.4 0.8 1.905, p<.05 3 2.5 0.5 1
Source information  4.6 1.7 3.28, p<.005 1.5 2.4 0.6 2.8 0.7 2.1
Judgements 1.3 1.2 1 1.5 4 0.5 2.747, p<.01 1.2 0.9
Cognitive processes  6 0.9 3.348, p<.005 0.7 2.7 5.6 2.0 2.551, p<.01 1.7 1.2
Explanations 3 0.8 2.806, p<.01 0.8 1.4 1 0.9 1.2 1
Self-references  7 1.3 3.292, p<.005 0.7 2.1 5.3 2.2 2.123, p<.05 1.5 1.7
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part of the everyday schemata of traffic systems, and of
priority accessibility with respect to other related knowl-
edge.
Finally, the data show that suggestion alone does not
seem to affect the accounts, except in an increase of
irrelevant information and expressions of doubt (in the
immediate condition) that appear in the descriptions,
which may be due to the fact that subjects could main-
tain active the two types of information (original and
false), which would lead to a reduction of cognitive
resources so that they were incapable of selecting the
relevant information. We also found higher rates of
exaggeration in these suggested accounts, and the expla-
nation for this may reside in the type of post-event infor-
mation manipulated. It should be borne in mind that in
addition to the suggestion about the non-existent stop
sign, the accident was described with two different
degrees of impact, whose consequences would involve
different levels of seriousness. The exaggerations are
found basically in the description of these consequences.
Delay, as expected, strongly affects the descriptions of
memories, resulting in a deterioration in their quality.
When participants recall the event two weeks after wit-
nessing it, the accounts contain less accurate, sensory
and contextual information, while there is an increase in
the number of details that characterize memory traces as
being of internal origin, mainly related to the appearance
of expressions of doubt.
Furthermore, the delay involved emerges as a key fac-
tor in the acceptance of false information, due to the
deterioration caused by time in the quality of the memo-
ry traces.
When the suggested information was provided imme-
diately prior to the free recall task, participants appeared
to recall both the original and the suggested information.
As shown by the data on information about source,
which are important in defining the origin of memories,
in the immediate condition participants spontaneously
mentioned numerous aspects related to the filmed nature
of the event when they were fed false information and it
was accepted. These data suggest an important role of
this type of information in the acceptance of the infor-
mation. It should also be stressed that suggested and
auto-suggested accounts, which in general terms have
similar qualities, differ considerably when analyzed in
terms of the time elapsed between the suggestion and the
recall. When recall is immediate, accounts that mention
the suggested data contain more information about
source, more explanations and fewer personal judge-
ments and comments than non-suggested accounts but
which also mention the false data (auto-suggested).
These rates, however, do not resist the passage of time,
and one week later the two types of account do not dif-
fer substantially, regardless of whether the information
is suggested or auto-suggested. In general terms, with a
one-week delay, the information would appear to have
become so integrated in the memory trace that the sub-
ject is unable to differentiate inaccurate accounts from
accurate ones, regardless of the source of the inaccura-
cy. When the accounts are accurate, nor are there signif-
icant differences with regard to whether or not the
respondent has been fed false information, mainly if the
suggestion (not accepted) took place one week earlier;
the exception is the case of allusions to cognitive
processes, which are more frequent in the accounts of
those given false information (even though not accept-
ed) –just the opposite of what occurs in the immediate
recall condition.
In sum, it can be stated that the longer the time interval
between the suggestion of false information and the
recall, the greater the probability of acceptance of that
information. In the short term no differences are found
between forced and spontaneous errors, where errors are
accompanied by lower quality of the accounts, in accor-
dance with the perceptual/self-generated dimension pro-
posed by Johnson and Raye (1981).
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
By way of conclusion we shall reconsider some of the
questions raised at the beginning of the paper:
a) Why do we confuse false data with what really
happened?
Some explanations of the errors forced by the sugges-
tion of false information claim that when this data is
incorporated into memories it substitutes the original
data (Loftus, 1975, 1982; Loftus & Palmer, 1974),
whilst other authors argue that the two types of infor-
mation would coexist (Bekerian & Bowers, 1983;
Bowers & Bekerian, 1984; Tversky & Tuchin, 1989),
and that subjects would tend to report one or the other
due to diverse factors, the most important of which are
task demands and faults in discrimination of the origin
of the memories. The findings of the present study
could support both explanations, which would be
applicable to different time points of the memory
processes involved.
The appearance of more irrelevant information in some
accounts in the suggested information conditions may
indicate that subjects maintain active both the original
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information and the suggested data, which would result
in a decrease in cognitive resources and a consequent
inadequate selection of central from irrelevant informa-
tion. This difference with regard to irrelevant informa-
tion tends to be found more in the immediate recall con-
ditions. These data may suggest two different phases in
the effect of post-event information. A first phase, which
would take place when the misleading information is
provided immediately before the recall task, and in
which this misleading data has not been integrated into
the original memory trace, so that the two types of infor-
mation (original and suggested) can coexist. The accep-
tance of one to the detriment of the other on describing
the event would depend on variables such as task
demands or faults in discriminating the origin of each
type. In a second phase, the memory traces have
decayed due to the passage of time and multiple recall,
and have thus lost basic characteristics for determining
the source of the trace and accessing contextual data on
the origin of the event. In this phase it would be more
difficult to discriminate the origin of the false data,
which probably already forms an inseparable part of the
trace. Further research is necessary to confirm this
hypothesis.
The modification of memory traces, however, does not
come solely from externally suggested information, but
also from auto-suggestions deriving from previous
knowledge (Bekerian & Conway, 1988; Brewer &
Treyens, 1981; Diges, 1995). In the first phase, immedi-
ately after the external suggestion of information, when
it does not yet form part of the trace and its origin could
be inferred, the two types of suggestion (external and
internal) are distinguished, but after time has elapsed
and they have been integrated into the memory trace,
this distinction is no longer possible.
b) Are real memories truly different from false ones?
The results of the present study only permit us to state
that the two types of memory differ in a few secondary
aspects, and not always, since this depends on the evo-
lution of the qualitative characteristics of the accounts
over time.
In this regard, the time elapsed between witnessing the
event and being asked to recall it, and the point at which
the false information is suggested, play an important
role both in the acceptance of the information and in its
effect on the quality of the memory traces. The less the
delay, the less the possibility of the false information
being accepted, and the less the effect on the quality of
accounts.
c) Can we assess the truth of an account according to
differential attributes?
It is a fact that memories decay over time in two direc-
tions. On the one hand they lose vividness, and some
details of the events we experienced become inaccessi-
ble; on the other, our memories become transformed
with the incorporation of false data. To such an extent
that a large part of our memories represent events which,
if indeed they occurred, never occurred in the way we
remember them. Moreover, given the fact that all false
accounts are produced from the modification of real
events, it will be difficult for us to discriminate which
data among all those provided by a person are real and
which ones are not.
The fact that no differences are found in the majority of
the characteristics of accounts, or that these are in the
opposite direction to what would be expected according
to the reality monitoring model, makes it difficult to dis-
criminate the origin of the information, leading to source
attribution errors.
If in the present experiment we tried to discriminate each
type of account according to the attributes it presented, in
the delayed suggested condition we would say that the
accounts which provide false information are more per-
ceptual (credible?) than those which do not provide it.  
Therefore, we should like to stress the need for further
research on the dimensions and procedures that permit
us to discriminate between true and false accounts (not
just the product of lying, but also of unconscious error),
with a view to throwing more light on their practical
applicability within the forensic framework.
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